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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 17-1689 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
  
SEKOU MALIEK DAVENPORT, 
        Appellant 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.N.J. No. 2-16-cr-00023-003) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 23, 2018 
 
Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA, and SILER, Jr.*, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 20, 2018) 
________________ 
 
OPINION** 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Sekou Davenport pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to deal firearms without a license 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, dealing firearms without a license in violation of  
                                              
* Honorable Senior Judge Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Circuit Court Judge for the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, sitting by designation. 
 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), unlawful possession of a short-barreled rifle in violation of  
26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  His co-conspirators Omar Davenport, his brother, and 
Darien Thompson, his cousin, entered into plea agreements and were sentenced to 87 and 
78 months’ imprisonment, respectively.  But Sekou rejected the Government’s offer of 78 
months’ imprisonment, preserving the right to argue for a lower sentence.   
At his sentencing proceedings, the District Court imposed a sentence of 87 
months, ten months less than the bottom of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range (97 
to 121 months’ imprisonment), but the same length as Omar’s sentence.  Sekou argues on 
appeal the District Court procedurally erred by ignoring the less culpable role he played 
in the gun-dealing conspiracy and failing to identify any unique offsetting aggravating 
factor to justify the conclusion that both Davenports deserved the same punishment.     
At the hearing, Sekou’s counsel asked the Court for a sentence less than his co-
defendants’ terms on the ground that he was the least culpable member of the conspiracy.  
Unlike his co-defendants, he was only responsible for a third of the transactions, his role 
was limited, and his abuse of PCP motivated his involvement.  The Government 
conceded that Sekou was the least culpable member of the conspiracy.  It nonetheless 
argued for a sentence above the co-defendants’ sentences because it had previously 
overlooked a two-level enhancement for the sale of a semi-automatic weapon that was 
included in Sekou’s Guidelines calculation.  Further, it argued that Sekou had a more 
serious criminal history.  That latter rationale fell apart as a proportionality factor, 
however, when no party could recall the histories of the co-defendants.   
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 In imposing the sentence of 87 months, the Court explained that the offense of gun 
trafficking contributes to violent crime, Sekou was serving a sentence of probation at the 
time of his criminal conduct, and the sentence achieves specific and general deterrence.  
It did not base its sentence on the relative culpability of the defendants.  In any event, 
Sekou did not object to the Court’s balancing of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.   
At Sekou’s sentencing, the Court asked the Government to address Sekou’s 
culpability relative to the other co-defendants.  In response, the Government asserted 
Sekou had a more serious criminal history, but, as noted, it could not recall the histories 
of the other defendants.  When prompted by the Court, the Government did not present a 
colorable argument that Sekou was less culpable than the others for the drug trafficking 
conduct.  Sekou’s counsel picked up on the issue and argued that Sekou was less 
culpable.  In discussing the rationale for the sentence, the Court stated it was required to 
“consider proportionality . . ..”  After explaining the seriousness of the offense, it paused, 
before turning to relative culpability, and asked again whether either co-defendant had 
been on probation at the time of the offense, as Sekou had been.  Still, no party knew the 
answer.  So the Court aborted the proportionality rationale, stating instead that Sekou’s 
firearms offenses while on probation were “a very aggravating factor[.]”  JA 148.  After 
selecting the sentence, however, the Court noted in passing that the term of imprisonment 
was appropriate, as it “reflects the same sentence that Omar Davenport got, because I 
think that should have some impact here in terms of proportionality.”              
We review Sekou’s sentence for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Fumo, 655 
F.3d 288, 308 (3d Cir. 2011).  Because Sekou did not object to the Court’s alleged 
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procedural errors after imposing his sentence, he must satisfy the plain error standard of 
review.  United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc); see 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).  To do so he must prove that (1) the Court erred, (2) the error was 
obvious under the law at the time of review, and (3) it affected substantial rights (that is, 
the error affected the outcome of the proceedings).  Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 
461, 467 (1997).  Even if all these items are met, the Court should only exercise its 
discretion in cases where the error “‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”’  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35 
(1993) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)) (alteration in 
original).    
We hold the District Court did not abuse its discretion.  It did not base the 
sentence on the relative culpability of the defendants.  Rather, it abandoned that factor 
when it became clear Sekou was less culpable than his co-defendants, and it treated his 
criminal history as an independent aggravating factor.  We do not view the Court’s 
comment after it announced Sekou’s sentence—“I think that should have some impact 
here in terms of proportionality[,]” JA 150—to suggest proportionality was a primary 
basis for the sentencing decision.  It did, however, respond to the limited argument made 
at sentencing.  See United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that 
a District Court “‘must acknowledge and respond to any properly presented sentencing 
argument which has colorable legal merit and a factual basis[.]’” (quoting United States v. 
Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2007))).       
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Moreover, in determining a sentence, a court must “(1) give rational and 
meaningful consideration to the relevant § 3553(a) factors; (2) adequately explain the 
sentence, including an explanation for any deviation from the guidelines; and (3) respond 
to defense counsel’s colorable arguments for mitigation.”  United States v. Thornhill, 759 
F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2014).  One of the statutory factors it must consider is “the need to 
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar conduct.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).  But we have concluded 
that factor is about the promotion of “national uniformity in sentencing rather than 
uniformity among co-defendants in the same case.”  United States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 
273, 277 (3d Cir. 2006).  Accordingly, we do “not require district courts to consider 
sentencing disparity among co-defendants.”  Id.  Thus, a “disparity of sentence between 
co-defendants does not of itself show an abuse of discretion.”  Id. at 266–77 (quotations 
removed).  
In this context, we affirm Judge Baylson’s sentencing determination.        
